The “soft power” of China as a way of resolving conflict situations in the Taiwanese Strait

Alexei V. Kashaev

Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok

Abstract: The study considers the issues of using the “soft power” by China as effective means of a civilized solution to the conflict situation in the Taiwanese Strait. The use of power pressure to forcefully “unify” Taiwan can lead to a violation of international shipping in the Taiwanese strait, Philippine and South China Seas, negative economic consequences and escalation of the situation between China and Taiwan into an international conflict.

Keywords: political situation, international conflict, “soft power”, China-Taiwan relations, settlement of international disputes

The Taiwan Strait, which separates mainland China and Taiwan Island, is one of the most important shipping routes in the world along with the Suez and Panama Canals, the Strait of Malacca and is of strategic importance for the world economy growth. The annual cargo turnover passing through the Taiwan Strait is estimated at 3.5 trillion dollars. Disruption or cessation of international shipping via the Taiwan Strait, which could occur in the event of an armed conflict between China and Taiwan, will lead to total global economic losses of about 10 trillion dollars.

The contradictions between China (PRC) and Taiwan (RoC) over possible reunification is a primary source for the conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China consistently advocates integration with Taiwan based on the principle of “one country, two systems”, and Taiwan seeks independence. Since 2017, the irreconcilability of the parties’ positions has led to confrontation and the use of “harsh” forceful methods of influence against each other. 

Thus, in 2017, PLA Air Force aircrafts conducted 20 sorties in the Taiwan Strait area, as well as three deployments of the ‘Liaoning’ aircraft carrier strike group to the Philippine Sea area. On April 2, 2019, two PLA Air Force Jian-11 aircraft crossed the Taiwan Strait separation line for the first time since 1999. Taiwan regarded this action as a “unilateral violation by China of an unspoken military agreement”. In 2020, the number of such sorties was 384, in 2021 – 961, in 2022 – 1727, in 2023 – 1709, in 2024 – 1625.

In August 2022, US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan, which prompted the PLA to conduct military exercises in Fujian Province with 15 missile launches into the waters of the South China and Philippine Seas.

In 2017-2024, China’s use of “hard power” approaches towards Taiwan was a kind of response from the Chinese side to the strengthening of Taiwan-US relations, as well as to the sharp increase in the number of Taiwanese residents advocating for the island’s independence from China (25.5% in 2020 compared to 12% in 2018). 

In October 2024, after Taiwan President Lai Qingde’s speech at the National Day celebration, a new round of conflict began. Lai Qingde again declared the island’s independence and noted that Taiwan and China do not obey each other. At the same time, President declared his readiness to adhere to the obligations to resist annexation or encroachment on the island’s sovereignty. In response, China stated that Taiwan has never been and will never become a sovereign state, and also held the PLA exercise “Joint Sharp Sword – 2024B” (October 14 – 20, 2024), practicing the mission of blockading the coast of Taiwan. In 2025, China continued its policy of military pressure on Taiwan. From April 1-5, 2025, the PLAAF exercise “Thunder over Taiwan” was conducted in Fujian Province and the waters east of Taiwan, involving J-10C fighters, Hong-6K bombers with ‘Eagle Strike-21’ missiles, “Shandong” carrier strike group, as well as the Dongfeng-17, Dongfeng-19 mobile IRBMs and the new Dongfeng-21 ICBMs. This exercise was conducted without a usual preliminary notification from the Chinese side. 

During this exercise, both standard training missions (simulated suppression and breakthrough of Taiwan’s air defense system, strikes on critical targets in Taiwan, blockading the Taiwan Strait and adjacent waters) and new ones (use of ‘Eagle Strike-21’ anti-ship missiles against sea targets, heavy landing platforms) were practiced.

Such a radical change in the focus of combat training of the PLA Armed Forces in the Taiwan vicinity indicates that the Chinese side, demonstrating its increased capabilities of the Navy and Air Force, takes into account that a forceful solution to the Taiwan problem is an ‘extreme measure’.

The US position on the issue of providing assistance to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from China is of the nature of “strategic ambiguity”, since if China tries to seize Taiwan, the US will most likely not have time to stop it.

At the same time, PRC will have an advantage over the US due to its proximity to Taiwan. However, it should be taken into account that a number of negative factors complicates conducting a full-scale landing operation.

These include the inability to secretly concentrate landing assets, the lack of sufficient forces and means to gain air and sea superiority, landing craft, the presence of well developed anti-landing defense on the coast of Taiwan and small islands in the Strait, as well as the lack of combat experience in conducting strategic operations of this level among the PLA Armed Forces.

Taiwan’s Armed Forces number about 150 thousand servicemen and 2.5 million reserve servicemen. The basis of Taiwan’s national defense strategy is to counter a Chinese invasion. However, Taiwan also lacks combat experience, and US support will most likely be limited to the supply of weapons and equipment.

An analysis of the situation in the Taiwan Strait leads us to the following conclusions. 

China’s exercises in the Taiwan Strait are, first, a demonstration of its increased military capacity. During the exercises, PLA forces practice to conduct individual elements of the blockade of the Taiwan Strait, the breakthrough and suppression of Taiwan’s air defenses, and elements of conducting an amphibious landing operation.

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