RUSSIA-DPRK TREATY ON COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES FOR NEA SECURITY

 Anastasia O. Barannikova

Admiral Nevelskoy Maritime State University, Vladivostok

Abstract: On June 19, 2024, during the summit between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was signed. Already in December 2024 it came into force. This document, among other things, provides for military assistance and makes it possible to talk about the formation of a new military alliance between the countries. Although it is still difficult to assess the depth and durability of the current rapprochement between the countries, the new treaty may have a significant impact on security in Northeast Asia. This article examines the prospects and new challenges for Northeast Asia that the conclusion of the treaty between Russia and the DPRK may entail.

Keywords: RF, DPRK, NEA, security, treaty, partnership, military alliance

The Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (hereinafter Treaty) was signed on 19 June 2024 during a visit by Russian president to Pyongyang. The document has come into force on December 4, 2024. Among other things, the Treaty  contains provisions stating that “In case any one of the two sides is put in a state of war by an armed invasion from an individual state or several states, the other side shall provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay…” [7]. During the bilateral negotiations, the Russian leadership also stated that “the Russian Federation does not exclude the development of military-technical cooperation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in accordance with the document signed…” [2] Thus, we can talk about the emergence of a military alliance between the two states.

Background 

Military cooperation is not new for the two countries. Russia’s predecessor, the USSR, had already carried out military-technical cooperation with the DPRK almost from the moment the Republic was founded in 1948. In 1961, the countries formalized their alliance by signing the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which provided for “military and other assistance” if one of the contracting parties “suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war” [8]. After the collapse of the USSR, this treaty, like other government agreements with the DPRK, was terminated. Despite the resumption of bilateral relations in the 2000s, the countries limited themselves to concluding a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation. That document provided for “cooperation in the field of defence and security that meets mutual interests,” but did not provide any military assistance. Indeed, there were no prerequisites for returning to the previous level of bilateral relations that time. The DPRK was busy solving internal problems and conducting active diplomacy towards the ROK, which was then pursuing a “sunshine” policy. North Korean leadership also made attempts to improve relations with the United States, which, however, failed when the Bush administration came to the White House. In addition, the DPRK had not yet completely overcome the mistrust that had developed after the Cuban Missile Crisis and was later exacerbated by Moscow’s change in foreign policy, which resulted in the establishment of ties with Seoul and the termination of agreements with Pyongyang. Finally, the DPRK was at that time taking its first steps to create a nuclear potential (the first nuclear test was conducted only in 2006) under pressure from the international community and did not feel confident enough to negotiate and develop relations.

As for Russia, it had experienced a change in ideology, economic and political system, had lost its position in Northeast Asia, and thus could offer practically nothing to the DPRK. Moreover, Russia (and China) might fear that military cooperation with the DPRK and, in general, demonstrative rapprochement with this country would provoke an increase in the US military presence in the region, accelerate the formation of the US-ROK-Japan alliance, cause an arms race and the emergence of direct security threats to Russia and China. Therefore, Russia not only did not make any attempts to advance relations with the DPRK to a new level, but even voted in the UN Security Council for tough sanctions against the DPRK, which also did not contribute to trusting relations between the two countries.

However, time passed, geopolitical situation changed and the preconditions for the development of military cooperation between the RF and the DPRK had finally been formed by 2022. This was facilitated by such factors as the aggravation of the crisis around Ukraine, the beginning of an open confrontation between the collective West and Russia, a sharp deterioration in inter-Korean relations with the coming to power of a conservative government in the South, intensified efforts by the United States, ROK and Japan to create a military alliance, etc. Although the conflict around Ukraine cannot be considered the main reason for the intensification of cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, it certainly played an important role – it allowed Pyongyang to express unconditional political support for the Moscow’ position and thus distinguish itself from Russia’s overly cautious and neutral “friends”. 

The changes that took the place in two countries themselves played an equally important role. The DPRK has become a full-fledged nuclear power, capable not only of defending itself, but also of providing assistance to a friendly state. Its foreign policy has also changed. After failed attempts to normalize relations with the United States, North Korean leadership  has focused on Russia and China, making relations with them a foreign policy priority. The progress made by the DPRK in the missile and nuclear sphere has given it confidence and influenced its traditionally wary attitude towards alliances. Indeed, a partnership between two or three nuclear-weapon states has nothing in common with alliances led by a nuclear power, where non-nuclear satellites are forced to sacrifice their political interests in exchange for defense guarantees. From this point, cooperation with Russia no longer contradicts the state ideology of the DPRK since it is rather an equal partnership than alliance with big power. Moreover, despite periods of cooling in the history of relations between the two countries, Russia has never been perceived by the DPRK as a threat, not least due to its lack of a dominant position in the region and influence on the DPRK, and, accordingly, low risks of abuse of this influence. Russia refrains from attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the DPRK and does not question the country’s right to defence and protection of sovereignty. As for Russia’s support for international sanctions against the DPRK in the past, North Korean leadership has already demonstrated its readiness and ability to open a “new page» in relations during its dialogue with the Trump in 2018-2019. 

As for Russia, developing partnership ties with the DPRK is also relevant at the moment and meets its interests. Closer ties with this country has acquired particular value since Russia reorients its foreign policy from the West to the East, which has so far been undeservedly deprived of its attention. In addition, until now China has occupied a dominant position among Russia’s Asian partners, which made the strategy of “ turn to the East» not entirely balanced. In the past, the development of relations with the DPRK was hampered by Russia’s efforts to maintain a dialogue with the West and the US and acceptance of their “rules of the game» on international arena, including such platforms as the UN Security Council. Now, Russia has realised from its own example the inconsistency of Western security concepts and is no longer trying to integrate into them, which gives it more freedom in building relations with the DPRK. One of the evidence of Russia’s changed position is vetoing of subsequent US resolutions following the DPRK missile launches [4], blocking of the extension of the mandate of the UN group of experts on sanctions against the DPRK [5], and the changed rhetoric of Russian government officials on issues related to the Korean Peninsula.

Thus, the signing of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and the DPRK was a significant but entirely expected event, a logical continuation of the two countries’ policies. This event will undoubtedly have an impact on security and the balance of power in NEA. But this impact will largely depend on how long the period of upswing in relations between Russia and the DPRK lasts. All previous rapprochements were usually too short-term to seriously affect both the countries themselves and the region. At the same time, despite the “cold economy”, political relations between the countries have always been friendly. The current rapprochement is taking relations to a fundamentally new level – a military-political alliance. Relations at this level, on the one hand, open up new prospects, on the other hand, can lead to new challenges for NEA security.

Prospects

Among the prospects, the Treaty can lead to:

– Reducing the risks of a serious conflict on the Korean Peninsula

The Treaty can significantly reduce the likelihood of a full-scale conflict around the KP, both on the initiative of the DPRK and on the initiative of the United States. Allied guarantees and obligations will force the DPRK to take into account Russia’s interests and keep its “hawks’’, if any, in check, to prevent a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. It is also worth noting that an alliance with Russia will allow the DPRK to feel more confident in terms of security. A confident country would direct its resources to the development of the economy, civilian industry, etc. rather than to provocations and an arms race. The DPRK already has a minimal nuclear deterrent potential, and nothing will take this potential away. As for its possible weakness compared to the US nuclear forces, it will be compensated by the now legislatively enshrined military assistance from Russia, the largest nuclear power.  

New Treaty between the DPRK and the Russian Federation may also produce an additional cooling effect on the American “hawks” and supporters of the conflict around the Korean Peninsula. In principle, the US would not have entered into a real conflict with the DPRK even before the Treaty was signed. Russia and China, which are interested in stability on their borders and the protection of their interests would not stand aside in the event of any serious conflict between the DPRK and the United States and thus would compensate the difference in potentials of the conflicting parties, including nuclear ones. However, the Treaty, after it came into force, gives Russia legal grounds for protecting its ally, direct interference in conflict and accelerates decision making and response to threats. At the same time the US when making decisions on the Korean Peninsula from now will have to take into account the interests of not only China but also Russia that will require more time and complicate the task for American “hawks”.

– Strengthening Russia’s position in the region

After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost its position in NEA, which led to the dominance of only two powers there – the United States and China. A bipolar order essentially prevailed in the region, where the choice of regional countries was limited to the support of the «big power» they were most dependent on. Even Russia’s position was limited mainly to supporting China in the KP issues, and this situation persisted despite the declared by Moscow “turn to the East» strategy. The current level of relations with the DPRK contributes to the increase of Russia’s role in the region. An opportunity is emerging for Russia and the DPRK to diversify military and economic ties that have been dominated by China and gain more freedom of action in general. In these circumstances the DPRK may not waste efforts on resuming dialogue with the United States in order to balance China, but manoeuvre between Russia and China and wait for more favourable conditions for negotiations with its most potential adversary. Russia has gained an important advantage – a loyal ally in the region, which expresses its full political support and makes Russian «turn to the East» strategy more balanced. Strengthening Russia’s position in the region contributes to the achievement of multipolarity and polycentricity, which are officially supported by Russia, China and the DPRK and which may also seem attractive to other countries. 

Even China may benefit from a military alliance of its neighbours, if only because it will relieve it of some of the responsibility and burden of supporting these neighbours and will help avoid complications in relations with the West in addition to those that have arisen because of Taiwan and Ukraine situation. China may also have more freedom in cooperating with the DPRK – now all attention is focused on military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, everything else has faded into the background.

– Restoring balance in the NEA

Over the last couple of years, the US has made significant progress in institutionalizing a strategic triangle of the US-ROK-Japan, aimed at containing nuclear DPRK, China and Russia. This and other US initiatives to formalise alliances and military-political structures cannot be called stabilising factors. The creation of the US-ROK-Japan strategic triangle among other things became one of the factors that accelerated the rapprochement between the DPRK and Russia. Military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, now legally formalized, can somewhat mitigate the negative consequences of this factor. Despite speculations in some countries there is no talk about an alliance or axis between Russia – the DPRK – China. Negative attitude of countries towards blocs and alliances of the type to which the USA is committed is well known. As for other, more equal forms of possible trilateral alliance, there are obstacles such as geopolitical considerations. In addition, all three countries possess nuclear weapons and are independent and self-sufficient in defense and policy. A trilateral alliance of powers possessing such qualities, would be an overreaction to the US alliance with non-nuclear regional powers. While the conclusion of bilateral treaties and partnerships between Russia, the DPRK and China and similarity of their views on security in the region could balance the consequences of the US-ROK-Japan triangle no worse than a trilateral alliance/union.

Challenges 

At the same time, new Treaty between Russia and the DPRK could exacerbate such problems as:

– Increasing split on the Korean Peninsula

Relations between the DPRK and ROK have deteriorated sharply since the current administration came to power in the South. Even if it is replaced by the opposition, one should not expect a sharp warming of inter-Korean relations. Moon Jae-in was criticized by Pyongyang [1] for his dependence on the US and attempts to serve as a mediator in the US-DPRK dialogue instead of developing inter-Korean relations. In addition, in recent years, such factors as efforts to form a strategic triangle of the USA-ROK-Japan and the conflict around Ukraine have been layered – these two factors led to widening the gap between the DPRK and the ROK (the former unconditionally supported Russia while the latter took the side of the United States and the so-called collective West). The positions of two countries have also been influenced by the factor of rivalry between China and the United States, although this influence is not so clear-cut, since China remains an important economic partner of the ROK, which forces it to maneuver between the US and China. But in principle, the above factors are already enough to set the countries against each other and make unification on the Korean Peninsula an unattainable goal. Understanding this, the North Korean leadership at the beginning of this year reviewed inter-Korean relations and officially abandoned the idea of ​​unification [3]. As for the new Treaty between Russia and the DPRK, it definitely continues the trend of increasing the split on the Korean Peninsula: the ROK has defence agreements with the United States, and the DPRK now has Treaty with Russia. As a result, both countries again find themselves in opposing “camps” and their positions become more irreconcilable.

– Strengthening the trend of “blocism” and “cold war” in the region

Although there is no talk of forming a Russia-DPRK-China triangle, bilateral treaties and partnerships concluded between the countries are perceived as opposed to the treaties and partnerships of the United States with its allies in Northeast Asia, which revives the specter of the Cold War and a world divided into two hostile camps (at least until Russia increases its influence in the region to a level comparable to China). The split between these camps has been on full display in recent years. This is especially noticeable in the work of such organizations as the UN. 

The rapprochement between Russia and the DPRK consolidates the “nuclear emancipation’’ of the DPRK and guarantees support for its position by two members of the UNSC and the NPT – Russia and China – in the nearest term. Both countries now reject or veto US draft resolutions and initiatives on the DPRK and the US invariably rejects constructive proposals from Russia and China [6]. If this trend continues, the activities of the UN Security Council, which are already ineffective, will become meaningless, as well as existence of this mechanism in its current form. 

The rapprochement between the DPRK and Russia may become an additional (but far from the main) factor reducing the value of dialogue with Washington for Pyongyang, hopes for the resumption of which appeared with the victory of D. Trump in the elections. In the long term, the DPRK will be interested in normalizing relations with the US, but at the moment it can maneuver between Russia and China and limit the priorities of its foreign policy to these two countries.

– Further expansion of US military presence in the region

Although the Russia-DPRK treaty cannot be considered a reason for the expansion of the US military presence in Northeast Asia since this presence started long before the Treaty was signed, it may give the US another pretext for further actions. In previous years, such pretexts included North Korean nuclear missile program, the growing influence of China, and Russian-Chinese cooperation. It will not be surprising that the US will use such a pretext as military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK to advance its initiatives to form a global architecture of military-political alliances, create problems for Russia and China in NEA and other regions, conduct more frequent exercises in the area of ​​the Korean Peninsula, increase the military contingent, etc. All this will negatively affect the situation in Northeast Asia and, at a minimum, will lead to another arms race in the region, including nuclear ones.

It is not yet clear whether the new alliance will be long-term, since the relations between the two countries, in addition to their will, interests and intentions, are also influenced by a number of external factors. At the same time, one should not expect that such temporary factors as a change of administration in the US and government in the ROK will seriously affect the relations between Russia and DPRK. Both countries will try to extract maximum benefit for themselves from the new Treaty, and provided there is consistency and a reasonable approach to the development of bilateral relations, such an alliance can not only open a new page in bilateral relations, but also reformat the balance of power in the region.

Given a sufficiently long “life,” the Treaty opens up many positive prospects both for individual countries and for the region as a whole. As for the challenges, it does not create these challenges in itself, which arose independently and long before the development of the partnership between Russia and the DPRK. Quite the contrary, the Treaty has become the only possible response to these challenges.

REFERENCES:

1.Press Statement by Deputy Department Head of the WPK Central Committee Kim Yo Jong, KCNA, 2.01.2024, URL: http://www.kcna.kp 

2.Putin: Russia does not rule out development of military-technical cooperation with the DPRK, TASS, 19.06.2024, URL: https://tass.ru/politika/21139615

3. Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Makes Policy Speech at 10th Session of 14th Supreme People’s Assembly, KCNA, 16.01.2024, URL: http://www.kcna.kp

4. Russia and China blocked a resolution in the UN Security Council to tighten sanctions against the DPRK, Kommersant, 27.05.2022, URL: https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5369470

5.Russia vetoes UN Security Council resolution to extend mandate of experts on sanctions against DPRK, INTERFAX.RU, 28.03.2024, URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/952997

6.The US has blocked a UN Security Council draft of China and Russia on the situation in the DPRK, Izvestia, 15.03.2018, URL: https://iz.ru/720093/2018-03-15/ssha-zablokirovali-proekt-sb-oon-ot-knr-i-rossii-po-situatcii-v-kndr 

7.Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation, KCNA, 20.06.2024, URL: http://kcna.kp/ru/article/q/848b072d48dcc965d89ce5f716e78e71.kcmsf

8.Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the DPRK, URL: https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/https://ru.wikisource.org/wiki/Договор_о_дружбе,_сотрудничестве_и_взаимной_помощи_между СССР и КНДР